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Abstract 
Decline and break-up of institutionalized cooperation, at all levels, has occurred 
frequently. Some of its concomitants, such as international migration, have become 
topical in the globalized world. Aspects of the phenomenon have also become known 
as failing states. However, the focus in most social sciences has been on institutional 
emergence and persistence, not collapse. We develop an endogenous explanation of 
collapsing institutions. Collapse may be an implication of the very economic success of 
institutionalized cooperation and of increasing system complexity, when cognitive 
conditions for effective collective decision-making do not proportionately evolve. 
Moreover, we show that collapse is not a simple logical reverse of emergence. Rather, 
institutions break up at different factor constellations than the ones prevailing at 
emergence. We approach endogenous institutional break-up and its asymmetry from 
various paradigmatic and disciplinary perspectives, employing psychology, 
anthropology, network analysis, and institutional economics. These perspectives cover 
individuals, groups, interaction-arenas, populations, and social networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Collapse of institutional structures has been ubiquitous over thousands of years 
of human history (e.g., Turchin 2003; Diamond 2005; Tainter 2006; Acemoglu/Robinson 
2012). Recently, the collapse of the state-socialist countries of Eurasia in the 1990s and 
its socio-economic costs, a number of failing states, the apparent fragility of the entire 
global system, or the reduced collective-action capacity of the leading powers, when it 
comes to the maintenance of the global commons (e.g., Block 2000; Rasmus 2016), 
have become topical. And below entire systemic collapse, there usually are symptoms 
of institutional decline, at global, national or local levels, such as long-term economic 
downgrade, cumulative income inequality, social disintegration, or geographical 
fragmentation as well as symptoms of specific humanitarian crises as to food, health, 
water, land or shelter access, violence and wars, and subsequent enforced international 
migrations. 
Yet, the focus of historical, evolutionary, and institutional perspectives in 
economics has been on the structural emergence of cooperation.1 Explicit considerations 
of collapse have been considerably fewer, and if so, only recent (e.g., 
Acemoglu/Robinson 2012; Horiuchi 2015). The issue was largely left to other social 
sciences, particularly history, ethnography, anthropology, or social geography 
(Weiss/Bradley 2001; Tainter 2003, 2006; Brooks 2012; Meija 2018), and law and 
business (e.g., Richman 2016). Yet, most of these accounts consider the reasons for 
collapse as mainly exogenous: through the failure of a political system, an apparent 
mismanagement by the elites, and mostly through climatic factors, particularly ecological 
disasters. Sometimes, as in cases in Tainter (2003) and Diamond (2005), climate change 
and a population’s failure to adapt take effect, but most explanatory significance has 
been given to exogenous events. 
Only some few scholars have explicitly taken institutional aspects into account, 
such as a biased collective decision-making in the presence of sunk costs of institutions 
(e.g., Janssen et al. 2003). In this paper, we will consider relatively low interaction costs 
of established institutions and relatively high interaction costs under institutional break-
up and change, even if such change were appropriate and warranted. More generally, 
most historical instances, in which a complex society disintegrated and developed into a 
less complex one, where the degree of complexity and adaptability of collective decision-
making fell below a degree required for the maintenance of the larger, and changing, 
commons, have been candidates of collapse (e.g., Tainter 2003; Turchin et al. 2013). 
                                               
 
1 The contributions here come from various perspectives and paradigms: see, e.g. Axelrod 
(1984) for the evolution-of-cooperation approach, Hodgson (2000) for original institutionalist 
contributions, Epstein/Axtell (1996) for complexity sciences, or Boyd/Richerson (1985) for the 
anthropological approach. 
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Too little complex and too little adaptive societies and their governance structures, in 
relation to changing requirements, regardless of particular ecological or technological 
disasters, may have rendered interaction costs too high (Meija 2018). This causes a 
fragmentation of populations into relatively (too) small groups, in this way constraining 
communication and interaction, reducing higher-level collective-decision capacity, 
eventually leading to collapse. 
The present paper contributes to that still small but growing literature on the 
degeneration, inadequacy, and eventual collapse of institutionalized cooperation, by 
adopting transdisciplinary and trans-paradigmatic perspectives. It is motivated by two 
key theses: First, collapse is not necessarily tied to exogenous events, but might well 
occur because of endogenous dynamics. This resembles the idea of “improving oneself 
into extinction” (Elster 1983,54), which was applied to an individualistic rationality in 
ubiquitous social dilemmas. It also applies to the development of populations, when the 
reach, complexity, or adaptability of collective decision-making is no longer appropriate 
to the size, complexity, and change of the socio-economic and natural conditions, namely 
of their commons, and when this stems from the very success of the earlier 
institutionalized coordination of the population, but these very institutions have at some 
point become inadequate. Second, collapse of cooperation also typically is not merely a 
reversal of its emergence. Otherwise, its theoretical comprehension would be a simple 
derivative of the work on emergence. Rather, as the various disciplinary perspectives 
developed below indicate, collapse follows different rules than emergence, it is 
asymmetric to emergence and is a subject of investigation in its own right. 
To investigate these claims, we integrate arguments from various perspectives 
that have studied collapse each in their specific contexts: the biology and evolutionary 
psychology of the individual (section 3), the anthropology of group behavior (section 4), 
network science (section 5), and evolutionary institutionalism applying evolutionary 
game theory (section 6). At the end of each section, we derive hypotheses about the 
mechanisms and dynamics of collapse, i.e., its endogeneity and/or asymmetry. In section 
7, we show that the perspectives employed in fact converge to a theoretical frame for 
modeling, where collapse is endogenous and asymmetric to emergence. 
2. On the endogeneity and asymmetry of collapse 
This section elaborates on the two main claims introduced above, namely that, 
first, decline, crisis, and collapse of large-scale institutional cooperation will often turn out 
to be some endogenous implication of its very success and, second, that it will not be a 
simple logical reverse of emergence. 
We begin with the latter proposition. It can be illustrated, based on some formal 
modeling (see section 6), that institutional emergence is unavoidably subject to 
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interactive learning, trial and error in evolutionary processes, and some risk-taking, as it 
implies some potential early disadvantage of the behavioral innovator compared to 
followers and imitators. Further, institutional emergence is subject to some broader and 
longer-run perspective, and, finally, to some generalization of experience into one’s 
expectations and habituation. In all, institutional emergence implies unavoidable sunk 
fixed costs of individual and collective decision-making (e.g., Elsner/Schwardt 2014). 
Therefore, some institutional hysteresis may easily become prevailing at some later 
point, when institutional cooperation should be adapted to a changing decision situation, 
but the same institutionalized (and habituated) behavior will be retained beyond that point 
of adaptation, because it is easier for the individual to stick to the prevalent institution 
rather than again interactively learn a new institution incurring new sunk fixed costs (e.g., 
Setterfield 1996). 
In other words, social institutions that are supposed to solve ubiquitous social 
dilemmas logically cannot be based on hyper-rational (short-term) maximization 
behavior. Institutions, thus, are to be applied semi-consciously, as long as there is no 
particular reason to expect that the next interaction partner will defect. Such learning and 
habituation will require individual investment in terms of time for trial and error and risk-
taking of being exploited under fundamental strategic uncertainty. The sunk fixed costs 
not only imply a general relative persistence and stability of institutionalized behavior 
over more volatile socio-economic variables, but, specifically, some hysteresis, i.e., the 
institution’s use beyond the point where it still was appropriate, when conditions change. 
In this way, it will be maintained just in order to realize economies of scale of collective 
decision-making. Thus, some institutional degeneration may occur: for some shorter or 
longer time, the established institution still may be appropriately problem-solving. And 
even if it becomes increasingly normatized and detached from the original basic problem 
structure, it still may be an appropriate norm. But it will sooner or later become 
dysfunctional and eventually an improper abstract norm (e.g., Elsner 2012; Sugiarto et 
al. 2015). Sticking to the old, now petrifying institution then may increasingly cause 
inappropriate decision-making, divert its carrier group from problem-solving, in this way 
entailing an institutional ceremonialization (Veblen 1899) of a formerly functional, 
instrumental institution. Then other motives come to the fore rather than collective 
problem-solving, such as redistribution of income, power, or status among individuals or 
groups, or bureaucratic hierarchization. Such increasing dysfunctionality may cause 
eventual collapse. 
This may be a consequence of cooperation success, an endogenous process 
also in another respect. The instrumental institution promoted effective decision-making 
and socio-economic success. Economy and society, and their commons, may have 
grown in size and numbers, affording greater differentiation and heterogeneity of agents 
and their relations. A higher systemic complexity can then be accommodated for some 
time with the reduction of the complexity of the individual decision situation through the 
very institution. However, as more agents will be integrated, problems arise for both 
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immigrants and incumbents. Institutions should adapt to accommodate larger numbers 
and more heterogeneity. But, cognitive conditions (changing experience and 
expectations) for both types of agents may deteriorate with increasing numbers, 
heterogeneity, and perceived increasing complexity and turbulence, and cognitive limits 
occur. If proper institutional adaptation will not or only insufficiently happen, both new 
agents and incumbents face incentives not to cooperate, and incumbents may stick ever 
more to the ossifying institution. Experience and expectations of trust and trustworthiness 
may deteriorate and cooperation may decay. 
Turning to asymmetry, there will occur a turning point from institutional 
emergence, stabilization, persistence, and instrumental functionality towards ceremonial 
inappropriateness, decreasing performance, and eventual collapse. But when and how 
does non-linearity (asymmetry) between emergence and collapse come into effect, 
under parameters moving gradually (linearly) back and forth? The very sunk fixed costs 
suggest that institutions will tend to exist longer than would be effective for high 
performance, and still will exist under unfavorable circumstances, in which cooperation 
would not have emerged. For instance, the minimum critical mass of agents required to 
establish an institution may be larger than the minimum critical mass that still keeps an 
old institution somehow working, how (increasingly) poorly ever. Thus, a socio-economic 
collapse still may be prevented for some time. 
Anthropology deepens the understanding of the endogeneity and asymmetry of 
emergence and break-up by putting emphasis on the environment of developing socio-
economies. The presence or absence of competing groups or societies influences the 
cohesiveness and fragility of a cooperative regime. This is the essence also of Turchin’s 
(2003) argument on the emergence of large-scale cooperation through group-level 
competition and selection. In human evolution, selection favored prosocial, cooperative 
behavior within groups to an extent that is exceptional within the animal kingdom and 
cannot just be explained by genetic evolution. Rather, the emergence of human cultural 
capabilities facilitated processes of inter-group selection, helping particularly cooperative 
group cultures to gain competitive advantages over less cooperative ones. As a result, 
the human behavioral repertoire includes psychological dispositions for cooperation that 
were acquired in a co-evolutionary process of rising cultural capabilities and genetic 
adaptations required to live in cultural environments (e.g., Toth/Robinson 2007; Henrich 
2016). The specific expression of those dispositions, however, depends on the cultural 
und institutional dynamics. The history of the last ca. 10,000 years provides very distinct 
solutions to large-scale coordination that may exhibit either cooperation or dominance 
(e.g., Traulsen/Nowak 2006; Wilson et al. 2013). This is consistent with the game-
theoretic insight of multiple solutions for social dilemmas above the benchmark of 
complete defection, as given by the “folk theorem”. 
Beyond such mechanisms of endogenous emergence, anthropology also 
provides evidence for asymmetry: the propensity to cooperate is asymmetric with respect 
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to size. While small groups may spontaneously develop a cooperative culture, successful 
groups and populations that have grown into larger entities will have to rely on further 
provisions, particularly institutions that involve formal hierarchies. So, while institutions 
may emerge in small groups and persist in large ones through additional factors, 
institutional collapse may occur in large groups when those additional factors of 
stabilizing cooperation disappear (see sections 3 and 4). 
Against this background, we state our two initial claims as hypotheses, which will 
be refined from the various perspectives in the following sections: 
H1: Endogeneity: In the evolutionary process of the emergence of institutionalized 
cooperation, there are mechanisms (in group psychological, cognitive, interaction- and 
network-related respects) that make institutional decline and collapse endogenously 
occur through the very institutional success. 
H2: Asymmetry: Due to different habituated, group-based, and cultural-
dispositional aspects of institutional emergence, institutional collapse may occur 
asymmetrically to (at different parameter constellations than) its emergence. 
3. The individual level: Psychological determinants of 
cooperation and its collapse 
In this section, cooperation is conceptualized as a prosocial act towards another 
person, which comes at a cost for the acting individual. We refer to the fact that 
humans are characterized by a fundamental motivational ambiguity towards their social 
counterparts due to their evolutionary history (e.g., Boehm 1989; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1997). 
This has also been the foundation of the theory of individual behavior in fundamental 
works in economics since Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), and later, 
for instance, in evolutionary-institutional economics (Veblen 1899): on the one hand, 
there is a phylogenetical legacy of our primate ancestors that can make us behave 
agonistic and opportunistic (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1997, 525-560). On the other hand, 
evolutionary trends in early hominids, enhanced by processes of cultural group 
selection of competing hominid bands (e.g., Richerson/Boyd 2005), lead to the genetic 
fixation of several genuine human prosocial capabilities, such as empathic behavior, 
sense of fairness, and spontaneous cooperation. Which part of human nature is 
actually displayed depends on the circumstances of social interaction, variance in 
personality, learning processes, and cultural influences (e.g., Tomasello 2009). In the 
following, we discuss individual-level determinants for cooperation (3.1.) and those for 
collapse (3.2.). From this we specify our hypothesis on the endogeneity of collapse 
(3.3.). 
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3.1. Individual-level determinants for prosocial behavior and cooperation 
According to Tomasello (1999), the evolution of empathy was a major 
evolutionary step not only for the development of cultural learning abilities, but also for 
our natural inclination to act prosocially. In neuroscience, empathic reactions are studied 
by using neuro-imaging techniques in experiments that involve social interactions and 
provide hints for a physiological basis of cooperative behavior. According to 
Singer/Lamm (2009), an empathic reaction occurs when the observation of affective 
states in another person induces shared states in the observer. fMRI studies have 
investigated empathic responses in several emotional states including pain, anxiety, 
anger, pleasant affects, social exclusion, or embarrassment (see Bernhard/Singer 2012). 
These responses are taking place in brain regions (anterior insula, anterior and 
midcingulate cortex) that are usually activated if the person herself feels these emotions. 
Additionally, brain areas that are associated with social recognition are active in empathic 
situations. Empathy is distinct from emotional contagion or mimicry: while these do not 
require a separation from the source of the respective emotion (the self or the other), 
empathetic reactions involve affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinction. 
Batson et al. (2007) argue that while observing a person suffering, the observer does not 
only represent the related pain within her own brain, but is motivated to relieve the 
suffering of the respective person, which translates into prosocial behavior. Hein et al. 
(2010) find that the induction of helping behavior is triggered by empathetic reactions. 
That spontaneous prosocial behavior in humans is present already with young infants 
has been shown in experimental studies (e.g., Bischof-Köhler 1991; 
Warneken/Tomasello 2009). This indicates that altruistic tendencies in humans reflect 
genetic predispositions. 
Why do humans have genetic dispositions toward prosocial behaviors that are so 
vital for the emergence of cooperation? Ethology explains this via the rearrangement of 
functional behavioral modules during human evolution. Lorenz (1974) argues that 
prosocial emotions emerged originally by a redirection of initially aggressive drives 
(evoked by the social partner) toward a third party. The social partner serves as a 
“release mechanism” of aggressive psychic energy that is diverted to the environment, 
preferably to out-group persons. Recent ethologists argue that brood-caring instincts, 
which initially evolved in the context of childcare, are redirected toward the “extended 
family”. The dyadic emotional dispositions between mother and child were extended first 
to a triadic relationship including the father and later on to the whole social group (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt 1997, 525-560). Similarly, the “big-mistake-hypothesis” in evolutionary 
psychology argues that in the course of increasing social abilities in humans, behaviors 
that evolved for kinship relations were extended to non-kin present in the social 
surrounding (Burnham/Johnson 2005). 
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3.2. Individual-level determinants of opportunism and non-social behavior 
As indicated, prosocial behavior and its correlating brain structures are, in 
phylogenetic terms, relatively young. They are therefore competing with a more ancient 
emotional heritage of our primate ancestors, which presumably has been much more 
agonistic. While humans are able to extend their prosocial inclinations into an 
environment that is very different from the situation under which the social brain has 
evolved, there are also situations that trigger agonistic and opportunistic behavior or 
make it more likely. Indeed, several mechanisms at the group level evolved to keep these 
non-social tendencies under control (see section 4). In the absence of such control, non-
social behavior becomes much more likely. 
Knickmeyer et al. (2006) show that fetal testosterone levels are responsible for 
the degree of empathy a person can display in later life. Women seem to be on average 
more capable of empathic reactions than men are, because of lower testosterone 
production in sensitive phases of social brain development. Accordingly, men are more 
likely to show agonistic behavior. Baron-Cohen (2002) argues that above-average 
expression of testosterone in early – usually male – infancy may even lead to an absence 
of emphatic abilities. These persons then often have tremendous problems in their 
socialization and show usually reduced prosocial abilities. Bischof-Köhler (1991) argues 
that the ability to empathize can also induce malicious gloating if the personal relation 
(e.g., with an observed person in pain) is bad. Bernhard/Singer (2012) argue on the basis 
of fMRI studies that empathic reactions of people may be reduced if competing neuronal 
networks, e.g., the ones associated with emotions of revenge in the nucleus accumbens, 
are active. 
In human ethology, it is argued that agonistic behavior is induced by the so called 
“fight and flight” system, suppressing prosocial behaviors (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1997, 
525-560). In situations of danger and stress, several neuro-active substances and 
hormones are released to push muscular activation in order to facilitate defense. This 
holds true for social stress as well (e.g., Jansen et al. 1995). One situation that may 
induce stress reactions is the presence of strangers. In children of a certain age, as well 
as in many native hunter-gatherer communities, out-groupers are not evoking 
spontaneous prosocial behavior, but are treated with caution or even fear. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
(1997, 242) argues that this is a universal trait that has to be modified by individual 
learning and cultural imprinting. Hein et al. (2010) find that the propensity to help in-group 
members via activation of empathic neuronal networks is increased compared to out-
group members in adults. 
A variety of in-group conflicts trigger agonistic behaviors, e.g., situations where a 
person is bullied or treated unfairly. In most cultures, people expect to be treated fair in 
social interaction and react with considerable willingness to punish defectors if these 
expectations are violated (e.g., Henrich et al. 2001; Fehr/Fischbacher 2003). This 
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includes the costly punishment of someone who has treated a third person of the group 
in an unfair manner. Singer et al. (2006) find that empathic reactions are modulated by 
the perceived fairness of others. The strength of these reactions against a cheater 
receiving shocks is significantly reduced, which may correlate with the willingness to 
punish unfair agents. The defense of fairness rules and the suppression of bullying may 
also be connected to the human tendency to preserve an egalitarian social structure 
(e.g., Boehm 2001). 
Bullying behavior may be triggered by a personality that lacks empathic abilities, 
harsh environmental conditions and stress, or by opportunities to exploit in the absence 
of functioning social control mechanisms. Extreme forms of anti-social behavior, 
however, are often associated with reduced sizes of brain structures associated with 
emotions, such as the amygdala or the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Kiehl et al. 2001; 
Raine/Yang 2006). The question whether there exists a drive for aggressive behavior 
per se, producing spontaneous aggression, or if aggression is mainly instrumental to 
achieve other goals, is by no means settled in the literature (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1997, 
535). Finally, the impact of hierarchy on spontaneous cooperation in the context of 
organizations is studied in Witt/Schwesinger (2013). Identification with a group or its 
goals is a major motivation to behave cooperatively, as is discussed in the following 
section. 
From these findings it follows that individuals can be considered to show 
spontaneous cooperative and prosocial behaviors based on compassion and empathy 
and experienced as self-rewarding. People are more likely to show considerable degrees 
of prosocial behavior within their own social group, though, preferably against individuals 
they are emotionally attached to. However, this prosocial tendency is fragile: individual 
ontogeny and learning, stressful situations, crestfallen expectations concerning the 
behavior of others, as well as influences from the wider cultural background may trigger 
non-cooperative or even aggressive behaviors. We therefore expect that the ambivalent 
human nature facilitates cooperation in large-scale social systems if the institutional 
setting is robust enough to accommodate situations that would trigger opportunistic or 
anti-social responses. This is summarized by our first specific hypothesis: 
H1.1: Humans have both a propensity for aggressive (selfish, non-cooperative) 
behavior and prosocial psychological predispositions. The latter provide a basis for large-
scale cooperation, which is much more common toward perceived in-group members. 
The willingness to behave cooperatively relies on expectations regarding mutual 
compliance with social institutions, such as equal treatment, and related norms, such as 
fairness and reciprocity. The violation of these institutions activates antagonistic 
cognitive modules, i.e., the propensity for aggressive behavior. This evokes costly 
punishment and exploitative behavior, finally causing cooperation to collapse. 
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4. The group-level: Anthropological evidence on group-
based cooperation and its collapse 
A central tenet of evolutionary theories is that behavior of organisms should 
maximize genetic fitness. As a corollary of this, natural selection should lead to 
cooperation among large numbers of individuals only if they are genetically closely 
related. With the exception of humans, where cooperation with non-relatives emerges 
spontaneously in small- and medium-sized groups, this result is consistent with available 
evidence (e.g. Mayr 1991). Large-scale cooperation is a kind of first choice only for 
human agents. In most organizations, employees cooperatively contribute much more to 
their organization’s overall goal achievement than the minimum that could be extracted 
from them by supervisory enforcement of the (not fully specifiable) employment contract 
(e.g., Cordes et al. 2008; Carpenter et al. 2009). Yet, every organization faces the 
problem of the commons: benefits that are jointly gained and shared by all – non-
contributors and contributors – and the resulting temptation of free-riding (e.g., Hardin 
1968; Simon 1991). Why, then, is there anything besides free-riding? Why are humans 
capable of large-scale cooperation among non-relatives? And when does this large-
scale cooperation break down? 
4.1. Cultural group selection and the emergence of group-bound cooperation 
The ancestors of modern humans became highly cultural in the Middle 
Pleistocene, perhaps 250,000 years ago (e.g., McBrearty/Brooks 2000). Humans are 
unique in the degree to which they depend upon culturally transmitted information to 
create complex adaptations (Norenzayan/Heine 2005). Boyd/Richerson (2002) 
proposed that the dispositions for cooperation and group-beneficial behaviors have 
evolved in a process of (1) gene-culture coevolution in combination with (2) cultural group 
selection (also Tomasello 2009; Henrich 2016): (1) the prevalent level of cooperation in 
a group as cultural arrangements exert some selection on innate human social 
dispositions. Culturally evolved social environments favor an innate psychology that is 
suited to these environments, such as a psychology aiming at social rewards and 
avoiding social sanctions (e.g., Rilling et al. 2002; Reuter et al. 2011). Moreover, 
repeated gene-culture coevolutionary cycles established more and more complex social 
institutions of cooperation in groups based on these evolved cognitive features. Over 
many generations this coevolutionary dynamic generated a social psychology that 
facilitates cooperation and other prosocial behaviors. These cognitive dispositions are 
the coevolved products of genes responding to the social and moral environments 
created by cultural institutions. This selective mechanism involves quite different 
behaviors from those favored by selection on genes alone. (2) By producing multiple 
behavioral equilibria among groups that comprise group-beneficial equilibria, cultural 
evolution endogenously facilitated a mechanism of selection among groups that favored 
prosociality (Henrich 2004; Soltis et al. 1995): cultural group selection selected from 
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alternative behavioral equilibria in favor of the ones most successful in competing with 
other groups. In this context, groups with higher prosocial norms including cooperation 
had an advantage over groups with more competitive internal cultures. 
Many aspects of group life root in this evolutionary past of humans 
(Robson/Kaplan 2003; Henrich, 2016). Their evolved cognitive dispositions – including 
prosocial behaviors – adapted for living in groups. The more complex societies of the 
sort we live in today only began to evolve about 5,000 years ago, too little time for much 
evolution of the genetic aspects of our social psychology. Hence, contemporary complex 
societies are based upon the cultural evolution of institutions using our social 
predispositions that resulted from the processes described. Anthropology argues that 
human nature is fundamentally tribal (see Richerson et al. 2006). Consequently, the 
group is critical to an understanding of human behavior and the workings of society’s 
institutions. Individual dispositions to cooperate can be sufficient, in the first instance, to 
initiate and sustain cooperation in small-scaled groups using informal face-to-face 
interactions. Moreover, these social predispositions include a tendency to identify with 
larger, symbolically marked groups and their institutions and norms (e.g., McElreath et 
al. 2003). Large, complex global societies, therefore, still depend upon the dispositions 
that help stabilize cooperation in small groups as their building blocks (e.g., 
Richerson/Boyd 2005). 
Anthropologist Coon (1946) argued that small groups, in which people know one 
another personally and meet and communicate habitually, form the fundamental units of 
human organization. Thus, the only successful way to organize human agents in larger 
and more complex societies is through combination of small groups as face-to-face 
organizations.2 Essential organizational processes are grounded in person-to-person 
relationships that are not part of formal control systems. Also, studies on village-scale 
commons management suggest that small, band-based systems can be maintained by 
informal agreements, but that larger systems may require formal rules and mechanisms 
as well, such as formal monitoring and sanctioning (Ostrom 2000) – and need to be built 
from basic modules as a layered multiplex network structure (e.g., Simon 1962; Wilson 
et al. 2013; see section 6). Thus, the band-sized group represents the limits of 
cooperation organized by purely informal means. Larger groups that produce significant 
benefits have clearly articulated (formal) institutions for monitoring and enforcement. 
 
                                               
 
2 See also Simon’s (1962) theory of the modular architecture of complex systems. 
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4.2. Conditions of deteriorating cooperation and collapse: Group size and 
growth 
Cooperation is fragile and highly contextual, as shown, e.g., by the cross-
cultural variation of cooperation in ultimatum and public-good games (e.g., Henrich et 
al. 2006; Herrmann et al. 2008). A critical factor is group size and its growth (also 
sections 5, 6). A common finding in lab experiments and field data is that, as groups 
grow, performance declines: people who belong to larger groups are, other things 
equal, less satisfied with group membership, participate less often in collective 
activities, show more misbehavior, free riding, and contribute less often to group 
activities (Levine/Moreland 1990; Mukhopadhaya 2003; Forsyth 2006). Coordination 
problems through increasing uncertainty, decreasing trust, and motivation losses in 
larger, more anonymous groups with higher (perceived) complexity, opacity, and 
volatility (in meeting interaction partners) impair performance and prevent reaping 
productive potentials. 
Marlowe (2005) reviewed group sizes among hunter-gatherers who most closely 
resembled our Pleistocene ancestors. Local residential groups (bands) averaged 48 
(median 30) people, i.e., hunter-gatherer bands tended to equilibrate at group sizes 
around less than 50 individuals. These groups were nested within ethno-linguistic 
groups (tribes), whose sizes averaged 1750 members. The author found no indication 
of local-group sizes depending on other factors than cognition, such as, e.g., natural 
resources. Rather, the upper limit on group size appears to be determined by the 
frequency of bickering, reflecting an increase in free riding. This interpretation is further 
strengthened by the results of Dunbar (1993, 2008), who highlights the existence of 
cognitive constraints on our ability to maintain social, personalized relationships at a 
given level of emotional intensity (see Sawaguchi/Kudo 1990; Zhou et al. 2005). This 
manifests in the structure of the human brain: average species’ group size correlates 
with relative neocortex size. The derived expected critical sizes of human groups 
correspond well with the observations of Marlowe. 
These constraints are still relevant today. There is some anecdotal relevance 
given by the existence of tailored packages of management consultancy that aim at 
firms reaching a critical size at 50-60 employees. Firms below this threshold can be 
operated in more freewheeling, informal ways and face-to-face contacts by an 
influential business leader who maintains a cooperative corporate culture (Cordes et al. 
2008). Above that number, a change toward more conventional management practices 
or transition to smaller subdivisions is needed (Witt 1998). This implies that to sustain 
cooperation in growing groups (particularly more than 50 people) requires (1) more 
explicit and formal institutions, control, and sanctioning or (2) sophisticated structures 
of subdivisions. 
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These findings suggest that the collapse of cooperation occurs endogenously 
when group sizes increase without these counter measures being put in place (also 
Elsner/Schwardt 2014). It becomes more difficult in larger groups to realize 
institutionalized cooperation and related social and economic performance. Greater 
group size easily gives rise to basic changes in members’ behavior: more frequent 
appearance of opportunistic behavior in growing groups allows for the rapid 
actualization of non-social predispositions and the spreading of selfish behavior. 
Members who were willing to contribute to the benefit of the group may suddenly 
change their behavior when the group exceeds a critical size (see Gladwell 2000; Card 
et al. 2008). 
These insights from anthropology have implications for collapse and emergence 
of cooperation: 
H1.2: Endogeneity: In the course of cooperation-driven growth of groups, these 
reach a cognitive critical size beyond which the level of cooperation among their 
members may rapidly decline and collapse. Group size and the related economic entity 
are then likely to shrink again. 
Moreover, once opportunistic or free-riding behavior becomes an established 
behavioral alternative to cooperation, a return to large-scale cooperation at the group-
level is unlikely to happen. This leads to the following specific asymmetry hypothesis: 
H2.1: Asymmetry: The tipping-point of size-induced collapse of institutions of 
cooperation within groups is asymmetric to its point of emergence. When groups 
decline, the former level of cooperation will probably not be reached again. Levels of 
cooperation and organizational unit sizes as well as socio-economic performance will 
therefore remain for longer periods below the threshold (of parameter settings) of 
earlier cooperation emergence. 
5. Emergence and collapse of cooperation in networks 
Cooperation emerges more easily in closely connected small groups because of 
a relatively high probability to meet each other again. In practice, however, there are 
also large cooperative groups. This is because of structured interaction in social 
networks: not every agent of a population typically interacts with every other agent. 
Dunbar's (1993) cognitive critical group-size remains valid in larger and more complex 
population networks and is applicable to their smaller individual sub-populations. In this 
way, the structure of networks forms another critical factor as to the evolution of 
cooperation: there is a systematic impact of a population’s network structure, 
particularly of the degree distribution, clustering, average path-length, and the 
interrelations among those three, on the emergence and collapse of cooperation. 
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5.1. Network structures and the emergence of cooperation 
Compared to models without or with very simple network structures, the 
dynamics of both emergence and collapse of cooperation are different on non-trivial 
networks (Zenou 2012). There are a number of network structures that facilitate the 
emergence of cooperation, especially in models with imitation learning, i.e., agents 
copying the strategies of more successful agents in their vicinity (Fu et al. 2008; Fehl et 
al. 2011; Santos et al. 2012). The most relevant network properties are heterogeneous 
degree distributions and high degree correlations. 
High degree correlation is a property of a network according to which high-
degree nodes (hubs) tend to have high-degree neighbors. High degree-correlation 
allows cooperation to spread more easily between high-degree nodes (e.g., Rong/Wu 
2009). With lower degree-correlation, a network would have a substantial number of 
isolated hub-structures, in which defection may more easily persist. Heterogeneous 
degree distributions facilitate cooperation by generating a negative feedback for 
defecting hubs, and a positive feedback for cooperative hubs (e.g., Santos et al. 2012; 
Pacheco et al. 2009). Defecting hubs, i.e., defectors with many connections, cause 
their less well-connected neighbors to copy their defective strategy although well-
connected neighbors will be less easily compelled to become defectors. The spread of 
defection to the neighborhood reduces the hub’s success and forces it to copy the 
cooperative strategy from other hubs it remains connected to. Heterogeneous degree 
distributions are empirically highly relevant given that most social networks are heavy-
tailed (or even scale-free). 
Endogenous modifications of networks may also facilitate the emergence of 
cooperation. In this case, the network is dynamic and coevolves with the population. 
Choosing, avoiding, or cutting links to particular interaction partners facilitates attaining 
an initial critical minimum mass k (or ratio k/n) of cooperating agents. This enables 
cooperators to generate superior payoffs overall and thus take over the population and 
entailing social or spatial clustering among cooperators (e.g., Mantzaris et al. 2013). 
However, the mere fact that a network is dynamic does not inherently facilitate the 
emergence of cooperation on it. Network dynamics that are neutral or detrimental to 
the emergence of cooperation are conceivable. 
5.2. Network structures and the collapse of cooperation 
A change of the network structure toward a less favorable parameter setting, 
e.g., through the reduction of a high degree correlation, can hinder the emergence of 
cooperation. But can it also lead to the collapse of a cooperative population? 
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The effect of network structure is more complex indicating a clear asymmetry 
between emergence and collapse of cooperation. For the case of degree correlation, 
e.g., Rong/Wu (2009) found that a high degree correlation favors the emergence of 
cooperation, yet a low degree correlation stabilizes the current strategy configuration. 
Moreover, if a network is clustered, a cooperative group may be able to maintain itself 
as a cluster within a less and less favorable broader environment for some time. But if 
the environmental conditions deteriorate further, the group collapses and this collapse 
will be sudden and catastrophic. The group will quickly reintegrate with the rest of the 
population, once the mechanisms that protected the group vanish. The phenomenon 
has become known recently as Seneca effect, i.e., mechanisms entailing slow 
emergence but rapid collapse (Bardi 2017) and can conveniently be modeled within a 
catastrophe theory model (Heinrich 2018). 
Empirical social networks are highly clustered and subject to dynamic 
modifications that favor clustering. The described asymmetry should therefore be 
expected to occur frequently and strongly in social networks. The deterioration of 
favorable conditions for cooperation may be caused by a variety of exogenous 
changes. One straightforward example, for which the effect has been demonstrated, is 
changing resource availability (Sugiarto et al. 2015). 
Therefore, the network structure of a population has important implications for 
the asymmetry between emergence and collapse of cooperation: 
H2.2: Asymmetry: Consider a system with a network structure in which 
changing environmental conditions should lead to an emergence of cooperation at 
parameter set A, but to the collapse of cooperation, if change is reversed, at point B. 
For networks with homogeneous degree distribution, points A (emergence) and B 
(collapse) are stable and identical. For networks with heterogeneous degree 
distribution, A and B will be stable and significantly different from one another. 
H2.3: Endogeneity (partner selection) facilitates the emergence of cooperation 
by shifting both A and B in favor of the emergence and persistence of cooperation. 
H2.4: Endogeneity (partner selection) facilitates the emergence of cooperation 
relatively more than the collapse of cooperation. 
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6. An evolutionary-institutional perspective on endogeneity 
and asymmetry 
6.1. Emergence of cooperation 
The puzzle of cooperation gained attention in economics in the context of the 
private provision of collective goods in the 1960s (e.g., Runciman/Sen 1965; 
Olson/Zeckhauser 1967). The interest in cooperation further developed in relation to 
behavioral experiments and game theorists have incorporated psychological, 
behavioral, biological, and anthropological evidence into their models since then (e.g., 
Axelrod 1984, Bowles/Gintis 2013). The emergence of cooperation, thus, is usually 
based on iterated prisoners’ dilemmas in an evolution-of-cooperation approach. 
Interpreting this result within the framework of evolutionary-institutional theory, 
cooperation is not feasible based on myopic hyper-rationality. It rests on interactively 
learned and habitually applied social institution followed by boundedly rational agents 
and on learned expectations to meet the same interaction partner again or, more 
generally, to meet a cooperator in a population. With learned, acquired, and habituated 
cooperation in some interaction arena, a spill-over into other arenas, where agents 
interact in other positions and with other partners, becomes feasible (e.g., Gintis 2004; 
Bednar et al. 2015). Institutionalization, habituation, and further normatization may 
anchor cooperative behavior beyond myopic calculus and choice. Institutionalized 
cooperative behavior then becomes part of the broader social environment (e.g., 
Bowles/Gintis 2013; McCain 2014). Agents may cooperate even toward strangers in 
one-shot interactions. 
With this, cooperation behavior need no longer be tied to the original problem 
structure. It may be transferred to other arenas and may be maintained even after a 
problem situation has changed. In basic EGT, emergence and collapse of cooperation 
would formally appear symmetric and simply be reversals. Collapse would occur at the 
same set of values of, e.g., the discount factor or population shares, where emergence 
did before. But the institutional embeddedness of behavior allows to consider 
asymmetries between emergence and collapse. 
6.2. Factors of institutional emergence bear endogeneity of collapse 
Emerged institutionalized cooperation bears economic success through its 
superiority over common defection, for both the individual and the relevant population 
(or group), in the longer run. Nevertheless, the individualist incentive to defect and 
exploit remains dominant in the short run. The successful, cooperating population may 
grow in income and in numbers, be it through more progeny or higher attraction to 
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outsiders and increasing immigration. This expansion may deteriorate the very 
cognitive conditions of cooperation. In a growing population, newcomers may not learn 
incumbent cooperative culture sufficiently fast. The cooperators’ share in the population 
may fall below a minimum critical mass. Perceived uncertainty, over-complexity, and 
opacity may increase again. This implies a loss of recognized interdependence, of 
knowledge on problem-solving, of the perceived connection between action and 
reaction, or of a sufficiently long-run perspective (Glaeser et al. 2002; 
Solari/Gambarotto 2014). With returning myopia, the incentive to realize the short-run 
payoff becomes the dominant motivation again. Diamond (2005, 427-431) calls such 
backsliding into “rational bad behavior” the “most frequent” reason of collapse. 
Another reason for the endogeneity of collapse may be the uneven distribution 
of the gains of cooperation under differential hierarchical status, power, or network 
centrality. The ceremonial motive of more differential status and power may strengthen 
the mechanism to unevenly distribute the gains in favor of the more powerful. The 
empirical evidence for the relevance of inequality as a cause of socio-economic 
collapse is large (e.g., Turchin 2003; Furman 2017). Distributional aspirations for higher 
relative socio-economic position may then dominate over absolute achievement in a 
society. The more distributional aspirations dominate, the less socially mobile the 
society and the worse overall performance often will become (e.g., Veblen 1899 on 
positional struggle in predatory societies; also Torgler et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 2013; 
Nishi et al. 2015). 
Sticking to the old institution, then, is attractive for those agents who find 
themselves in the favored position. But, as C.E. Ayres (1962) pointed out, the 
dominance of ceremonial institutional behavior tends to lead even agents who do not 
benefit to continue following the established institutional habits. The habituated 
behavior provides institutionalized identity and belongingness to the lower ranks of the 
group (Brewer/Kramer 1986; Elsner 2012). Furthermore, habits save cognitive effort 
and match it with cognitive capacity and keep monitoring, punishment, and other 
transaction costs relatively low. The formally same habituated behavior will in those 
cases be exercised with different consequences, including a shift to a non-cooperative 
character, to exploitative relations, reduced socio-economic performance, and 
eventually economic decline, crisis, and collapse. 
6.3. Factors of emergence also bear asymmetry 
Cognitive limits and habituation also apply to the case of asymmetry. This 
relates to the fact that coordinating people onto a newly emerging institution is time-
consuming and costly. In the short term, an already inferior old institution may rationally 
seem worthwhile to maintain. This may apply even beyond the point where conditions 
(parameters) have reversed to the same state where the institution initially emerged 
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(for a model of such institutional asymmetry, e.g., Elsner 2012; Heinrich/Schwardt 
2013). The inferior, and by now inappropriate, old institution will then be upheld beyond 
the point of instrumentality. Under both variants of institutional inappropriateness, (1) 
dominance of the ceremonial dimension causing an increasing unevenness of 
distribution and a change in incentive structures and (2) ineffectiveness as to 
institutional economies of scale, an asymmetry of institutional collapse vis-à-vis its 
emergence is to be expected. Be it that it is upheld beyond the point of appropriate 
change or beyond the point of earlier emergence should the conditional parametrical 
configuration simply reverse. 
Due to such institutional hysteresis, there may be a period of stagnancy, while 
the final collapse is assumed to be relatively sudden. Further, once a culture of 
noncooperation spreads, it will be aggravated by increased monitoring costs and more 
costly punishment (Horiuchi 2015). Too fierce a punishment culture may also prevent 
innovation and further the degeneration of the institutional setting. High degrees of 
punishment are negatively correlated with cooperation, problem-solving, and socio-
economic thriving (e.g., Povey 2014). Other related costs then increase as well, such 
as costs of building reputation, signaling, contracting, controlling, insuring, etc. (Fu et 
al. 2008). Real-world examples of collapse result in increasing short-termism (e.g., 
Aspara et al. 2014) and winner-takes-all cultures, both entailing decreasing system 
resilience (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2015). 
Our evolutionary-institutional argument is summarized by the following 
hypotheses: 
H1.3: Endogeneity: Institutions of cooperation endogenously collapse when (1) 
their very success makes the relevant group or population grow, which may deteriorate 
the cognitive conditions required for cooperation through higher volatility, myopia, and 
opacity, i.e., perceived over-complexity, and increase monitoring and punishment 
costs. (2) Increasingly unequal distribution of the gains of cooperation in power- and 
status-asymmetries makes the same formal institutional behavior become ceremonial, 
so that the old cooperation eventually breaks up and general defection and a new 
distributive and positional struggle takes effect. 
H2.5: Asymmetry: Institutional collapse occurs asymmetrically, i.e., at less 
favorable levels of parameter sets than emergence when (1) redistributive processes 
and transformed incentives not only make the winners stick to the institutionalized 
behavior, but inferiors as well, who yield stability, identity, and belongingness, matching 
cognitive limits as to the pace of institutional change. (2) Institutionalized behavior is 
used beyond the constellation of its emergence when parameters reverse in order to 
save cognitive effort by habituation and normatization and to exploit decreasing costs 
of collective decision-making of the old institution. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we developed an integrative multiparadigmatic and 
multidisciplinary perspective on the collapse of cooperative institutions and their related 
socio-economies. We focused on mechanisms of the (1) endogeneity of institutional 
collapse and (2) the asymmetry between conditions of emergence and collapse. 
First, in the biological and anthropological perspective of gene-culture 
coevolution, our psychological endowment as a heritage from thousands of generations 
of human social evolution provides us with some disposition to behave prosocially and 
cooperatively (section 3). This is linked to an expectation that a partner will comply to 
rules of fairness, reciprocity, and equal treatment. If this expectation is violated, 
humans tend to switch to a more agonistic behavior. If interactions violate our 
expectation or norm set, our propensity to cooperate is strongly reduced. We 
endogenously (i.e., within the dispositional spectrum available), but often 
asymmetrically (e.g., under more non-cooperation than prevalent when the institution 
emerged), switch back to a phylogenetically more ancient propensity of aggressive 
(non-cooperative) behavior. Particularly, cooperation is connected to a perception of 
“in-group” vs. “out-group” and may collapse through (1) growth of the relevant group or 
(2) intensifying interactions with out-groups, which both cannot be sufficiently 
cognitively absorbed by the in-group members. 
Second, this is in line with findings from anthropology (section 4). Evolution and 
multi-level selection at individual, in-group, and between-group levels was a central 
driver of large-scale cooperation. Under strong between-group rivalry, cooperative 
institutions are favored by cultural group selection. However, the attenuation of external 
rivalry may relax the need to maintain these institutions entailing institutional decline 
and collapse in some groups (the relevant population). 
Third, network structures can influence emergence and collapse of cooperation 
(section 5). Among the characteristics that have been identified as favorable to 
cooperation are heterogeneous degree distributions, high degree correlations, and 
some endogenous link formation and removal dynamics. Further, conditions of 
emergence and collapse of cooperation on non-trivial networks are not typically 
symmetric. Instead, cooperative structures may, once in existence, be able to support 
themselves even under less favorable conditions. This capacity is limited though. 
Reaching this limit leads to a catastrophic collapse, not a gradual one that would mirror 
the emergence. 
Fourth, also an evolutionary-institutional analysis (section 6) reveals 
constellations where we find endogenous and asymmetric collapse. The very success 
of cooperation may lead to prosperity and growth of the group, which, in turn, may 
increase perceived turbulence and endogenously undermine the cognitive and 
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expectational foundations of cooperation. Further, cooperation gains may be unevenly 
distributed, which also may endogenously undermine established cooperation. There is 
ample empirical, experimental, and computational knowledge that inequality may cause 
institutional and socio-economic decline and collapse (e.g., Elsner 2017). In all, 
increasing turbulence, rising inequality and ceremonialization, entailing myopia, higher 
monitoring and punishment costs, may lead to a collapse of cooperation and socio-
economic prosperity. 
In terms of asymmetry, the very sunk fixed costs of institutional emergence, 
particularly habituation, psychological generalization, and normatization, imply 
decreasing average costs of collective decision-making and thus a tendency to apply 
an institution beyond the point where it became inappropriate and a new one should 
have emerged. And even if the set of parametric conditions linearly reverses, the 
values originally prevalent at emergence may already be undershot when collapse 
eventually occurs. The overlong maintenance of the old institution makes it ever less 
problem-solving and lead the economy into decline over a period of time, while the 
institutional collapse may occur suddenly when institutions experience cumulative 
crisis. 
Considering processes after collapse, it appears unlikely that a group will easily 
recover to re-emergence and previous levels of cooperativeness. This is known in the 
theoretical, historical, and empirical literature, e.g., for societies suffering from 
exclusive institutions (Acemoglu/Robinson 2012). Collapse of cooperation proved to be 
non-reversible for long periods, another asymmetry with the previous emergence and 
the foregoing collapse. We conclude that not only the process of emergence but also of 
collapse of prosociality is fundamentally endogenous to complex adaptive systems and 
their evolution. It is asymmetric in different disciplinary and paradigmatic perspectives. 
A largely consistent system of hypotheses could be derived, which can be used in 
further research for more detailed complex modeling and (empirically anchored) 
computational research. It is not only for theoretical and formal, but also for urgent 
contemporary practical reasons that economics should increasingly turn to problems of 
institutional and systemic collapse. 
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